Imported from jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace (
skills/.curated/scanning-for-hardcoded-secrets/SKILL.md). Install upstream withnpx skills add jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace --skill scanning-for-hardcoded-secrets. Copyright stays with the author (MIT).
Scanning for Hardcoded Secrets
Overview
The single most common cause of credential breach in 2026 remains
hardcoded secrets in source code. Engineers paste an API key into a
config file "just for testing," forget to remove it, commit the
file. The credential is now in the repository's history forever
(git rebase doesn't help if anyone cloned in between) and
extractable by anyone who reaches the repo: contractors,
ex-employees, attackers via .git/ directory exposure (see skill
six), GitHub bot scrapers crawling public repos.
The cost of detection-after-commit is near-zero (free tools exist: gitleaks, trufflehog, this skill). The cost of detection-before-commit is also near-zero (pre-commit hooks). The cost of remediation after the fact is rotating every credential exposed + auditing for exploitation + potentially notifying customers of breach. The asymmetry is severe, the discipline is the only constraint.
This skill scans a filesystem tree, matching against a canonical regex library covering the credential shapes attackers and bots search for first.
When the skill produces findings
| Finding | Severity | Threshold | Affected control |
|---|---|---|---|
| AWS access key (AKIA-prefix) | CRITICAL | Literal AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16} in any file |
CWE-798 |
| AWS secret access key | CRITICAL | 40-char base64 in aws_secret_access_key field context |
CWE-798 |
| GitHub personal access token | CRITICAL | ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36} or gho_, ghu_, ghs_, ghr_ |
CWE-798 |
| GitHub app installation token | CRITICAL | ghs_[A-Za-z0-9]{36} |
CWE-798 |
| Stripe live key | CRITICAL | sk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{24,} |
CWE-798 |
| Stripe test key | MEDIUM | sk_test_[A-Za-z0-9]{24,} |
CWE-798 |
| Anthropic API key | CRITICAL | sk-ant-api03-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{93} or similar |
CWE-798 |
| OpenAI API key | CRITICAL | sk-(proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{40,} |
CWE-798 |
| Slack bot token | CRITICAL | xoxb-[A-Za-z0-9-]+ |
CWE-798 |
| Slack user token | CRITICAL | xoxp-[A-Za-z0-9-]+ |
CWE-798 |
| Google API key | HIGH | AIza[A-Za-z0-9_-]{35} |
CWE-798 |
| RSA / OpenSSH private key | CRITICAL | BEGIN PRIVATE KEY header (RSA, OPENSSH, EC, DSA variants) | CWE-321 |
| JWT secret | HIGH | Long string in jwt_secret, JWT_SECRET, signing_secret field |
CWE-321 |
| Generic password literal | HIGH | password = "..." with non-placeholder value |
CWE-798 |
| High-entropy string in key/token field | MEDIUM | Shannon entropy ≥ 4.5 in key:/token: field context |
CWE-798 |
.env-shaped KEY=VALUE in non-.env file |
HIGH | Multiple [A-Z_]+= lines in .py/.js/.md files |
CWE-200 |
Prerequisites
- Python 3.9+
- Target source-code tree on local filesystem
Instructions
Step 1 — Identify the scan target
This skill scans a filesystem path. No authorization gate (it operates on local source code, not network targets).
Step 2 — Run the scanner
python3 ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/scanning-for-hardcoded-secrets/scripts/scan_secrets.py /path/to/repo
Options:
Usage: scan_secrets.py PATH [OPTIONS]
Options:
--output FILE Write findings to FILE (default: stdout)
--format FMT json | jsonl | markdown (default: markdown)
--min-severity SEV (default: info)
--include-tests Include files under tests/, test/, __tests__/, spec/
(default: excluded to reduce false positives)
--git-history N Also scan the last N git commits' diffs (default: 0
= working tree only)
--exclude GLOB Skip files matching glob (repeatable)
--entropy-only Only flag entropy-based findings (skip regex)
The scanner walks the tree, applies the regex library to every file's contents, and emits a Finding per match with file path, line number, severity, and the redacted matched text.
Step 3 — Interpret findings
CRITICAL = the matched string is a real credential shape that upstream tools auto-extract. Rotate the credential immediately. Audit logs for any API call against that credential since the commit landed.
HIGH = pattern strongly suggests credential but requires manual verification (the literal might be a placeholder or test fixture).
MEDIUM / LOW = entropy-based heuristic that needs human review.
Step 4 — Remediation
For any confirmed real credential:
- Rotate immediately. Don't wait to refactor; the leak window is between when the commit landed and when you rotate.
- Audit usage. Check provider's API logs for any unfamiliar calls against that credential since the leak commit timestamp.
- Remove from source. Move to environment variables, secrets
manager, or a runtime-provisioned secret. See
references/PLAYBOOK.mdfor per-language patterns. - Scrub history if reasonable.
git filter-repoorBFG Repo-Cleanercan purge the secret from history, but only if you can force-push and coordinate with every clone-holder. For public repos, history-scrub is often not worth the disruption compared to just rotating.
Examples
Example 1 — Pre-commit gate
# .git/hooks/pre-commit (or via pre-commit framework)
python3 plugins/security/penetration-tester/skills/scanning-for-hardcoded-secrets/scripts/scan_secrets.py \
--min-severity high --format json . | jq -e 'length == 0' \
|| { echo "Secrets detected. Fix before commit."; exit 1; }
Example 2 — CI scan on every push
- name: Hardcoded-secrets scan
run: |
python3 plugins/security/penetration-tester/skills/scanning-for-hardcoded-secrets/scripts/scan_secrets.py \
. --min-severity high --format json --output secrets-scan.json
- run: |
if jq 'length > 0' secrets-scan.json | grep -q true; then
echo "::error::Hardcoded secret detected"
exit 1
fi
Example 3 — Audit inherited codebase
python3 ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/scanning-for-hardcoded-secrets/scripts/scan_secrets.py \
/path/to/acquired-repo --include-tests --min-severity medium
--include-tests is important here because legacy test fixtures
often contain real credentials someone forgot to redact.
Output
JSON / JSONL / Markdown per lib/report.py. Exit codes: 0 clean, 1
high/critical, 2 error.
Matched strings are partially redacted in output (first 4 + last 4 chars visible, middle redacted) to avoid the scanner output itself becoming a leak surface.
Error Handling
- False positive on placeholder strings like
<YOUR_KEY_HERE>→ the scanner skips strings containing<,>,EXAMPLE,PLACEHOLDER,YOUR_,XXXX(configurable). - Binary file in tree → skipped (the scanner reads only text files by content-type sniffing).
- Large file → files >5 MB are skipped (avoids scanning compiled artifacts and lockfiles).
Resources
references/THEORY.md— Per-credential-family threat model, why each provider's keys are extracted by bots first, history-scrub decision framework, entropy-detection theoryreferences/PLAYBOOK.md— Per-language migration patterns (Python dotenv, Node .env+dotenv, Ruby Rails credentials, Go envconfig), provider rotation procedures, GitHub secret-scanning integration