Imported from jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace (
plugins/security/penetration-tester/skills/probing-dangerous-http-methods/SKILL.md). Install upstream withnpx skills add jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace --skill probing-dangerous-http-methods. Copyright stays with the author (MIT).
Probing Dangerous HTTP Methods
Overview
Most HTTP methods beyond GET/POST/HEAD are vestigial — leftover from WebDAV authoring stacks of the early 2000s, debugging features in legacy servers, or default-enabled methods nobody disabled at install time. Each enabled method that the application doesn't use is an attack surface: TRACE enables Cross-Site Tracing (XST), PUT enables arbitrary file upload to unprotected paths, CONNECT enables proxy abuse against internal services, WebDAV enables directory manipulation.
This skill probes the canonical method set and grades each based on its presence and response.
When the skill produces findings
| Finding | Severity | Threshold | Affected control |
|---|---|---|---|
| TRACE method enabled | HIGH | TRACE returns 200 with request echo | OWASP A05:2021, CWE-693 |
| PUT method enabled outside API path | HIGH | PUT returns 200/201/204 on non-API path | CWE-434 |
| DELETE method enabled outside API path | HIGH | DELETE returns 200/204 on non-API path | CWE-285 |
| CONNECT method enabled | CRITICAL | CONNECT returns 200 (proxy abuse open) | CWE-441 |
| DEBUG method enabled | HIGH | DEBUG returns response (legacy IIS / dev servers) | CWE-489 |
| WebDAV methods enabled (PROPFIND/MKCOL/COPY/MOVE) | HIGH | Any return 207 or 201 | CWE-538 |
| Allow header discloses unused methods | LOW | OPTIONS Allow includes methods app doesn't use | CWE-200 |
| OPTIONS returns full method enumeration | LOW | Allow:* or broad list | CWE-200 |
Prerequisites
- Python 3.9+
- Authorization for non-local targets
Instructions
Step 1 — Confirm authorization
"Do you have authorization to perform HTTP method probing on this
target? I need confirmation before proceeding."
Step 2 — Run the scanner
python3 ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/probing-dangerous-http-methods/scripts/probe_methods.py \
https://example.com \
--authorized
Options:
Usage: probe_methods.py URL [OPTIONS]
Options:
--authorized Attest authorization (required)
--output FILE
--format FMT json | jsonl | markdown (default: markdown)
--min-severity SEV (default: info)
--timeout SECS
--is-api Treat URL as API endpoint (relaxes PUT/DELETE checks)
By default the scanner treats the URL as a non-API endpoint where
PUT/DELETE should return 405. With --is-api, those methods are
expected and don't trigger findings — only the auth checks behind them
matter (delegated to other skills).
Step 3 — Interpret findings
CRITICAL CONNECT-open = your reverse proxy is letting external clients connect to arbitrary internal hosts (e.g., metadata endpoints in AWS/GCP). Ship same-hour fix.
HIGH TRACE = XST attack open. Combined with any XSS, attacker can read HttpOnly cookies via XHR. Ship-within-sprint fix.
HIGH WebDAV = file upload + manipulation surface. Audit references/ PLAYBOOK.md § disabling WebDAV.
Step 4 — Cross-skill chaining
After this skill, suggest:
auditing-cors-policy(#3) if Allow-Methods:* surfaceddetecting-debug-endpoints(#7) for the broader exposed-feature audit if DEBUG/TRACE both fired
Examples
Example 1 — Post-deploy method audit
User: "We rolled out a new ALB config. Audit the method surface."
python3 ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/probing-dangerous-http-methods/scripts/probe_methods.py \
https://api.example.com \
--authorized --is-api --min-severity high
Example 2 — TRACE / XST audit after XSS finding
User: "Found XSS on /search; checking if XST chain is possible."
python3 ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/probing-dangerous-http-methods/scripts/probe_methods.py \
https://example.com \
--authorized
If TRACE-enabled finding fires, the XST chain works: attacker XSS issues a TRACE request via XHR, the server echoes the request (including HttpOnly cookies that XHR-set-cookies access can't normally read), JavaScript reads the response body, full session theft.
Example 3 — WebDAV legacy audit on a recently-acquired domain
User: "We just acquired example.io — quick method-surface check before we re-point DNS."
python3 ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/probing-dangerous-http-methods/scripts/probe_methods.py \
https://example.io \
--authorized --min-severity medium
Often surfaces decade-old WebDAV / DEBUG defaults that nobody disabled on the previous owner's stack.
Output
JSON / JSONL / Markdown. Exit 0 / 1 / 2 per lib/report.py.
Error Handling
- Method returns 405 → expected behavior, no finding
- Method returns 403 → access-controlled (acceptable), no finding, but INFO note recorded
- Method returns 500 → INFO finding flagging error-handling concern
- Connection error → exit 2
Resources
references/THEORY.md— Per-method attack semanticsreferences/PLAYBOOK.md— How to disable each method per server type../analyzing-tls-config/references/AUTHORIZATION.md— Active-scan authorization