Imported from jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace (
plugins/security/penetration-tester/skills/detecting-directory-listing/SKILL.md). Install upstream withnpx skills add jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace --skill detecting-directory-listing. Copyright stays with the author (MIT).
Detecting Directory Listing
Overview
Web servers can be configured to auto-generate an HTML index page
when a request hits a directory without a matching default file
(no index.html / index.php / etc.). The auto-generated page
lists every file in the directory. This is by design for static-
file servers and FTP-style file-sharing setups; it's a misconfiguration
on application servers where the file tree was never meant to be
public.
The risk compounds in two ways:
- File enumeration without prior knowledge. Attackers find files you didn't link to (backup files, log files, old uploads).
- Chaining with exposed-files (#6). A
/.git/request that returns an autoindex listing reveals every object file under.git/objects/and confirms the entire repo is reachable for GitDumper-style reconstruction.
This skill probes commonly-vulnerable directory paths and grades each based on the framework-specific autoindex fingerprint.
When the skill produces findings
| Finding | Severity | Threshold | Affected control |
|---|---|---|---|
| Application-root directory listing | HIGH | / returns autoindex page |
OWASP A05:2021 |
| Backup / upload / log directory listing | HIGH | /backup/, /uploads/, /logs/, /dump/ autoindex |
CWE-548 |
Asset directory listing (/assets/, /static/) |
MEDIUM | autoindex on asset dirs (enables file enumeration) | CWE-548 |
| Config directory listing | CRITICAL | /config/, /conf/, /.config/ autoindex |
NIST 800-53 SC-28 |
| VCS subdir listing (chains with skill #6) | CRITICAL | /.git/, /.svn/, /.hg/ autoindex |
NIST 800-53 SC-28 |
| Generic root reachable via autoindex | MEDIUM | / or arbitrary path autoindex on app server |
OWASP A05:2021 |
Prerequisites
- Python 3.9+ with
requests - Authorization for non-local targets
Instructions
Step 1 — Confirm Authorization
"Do you have authorization to perform directory-listing discovery on
this target? I need confirmation before proceeding."
Step 2 — Run the scanner
python3 ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/detecting-directory-listing/scripts/probe_directory_listing.py \
https://target.example.com \
--authorized
Options:
Usage: probe_directory_listing.py URL [OPTIONS]
Options:
--authorized Attest authorization (required for non-local)
--output FILE Write findings to FILE
--format FMT json | jsonl | markdown (default: markdown)
--min-severity SEV (default: info)
--timeout SECS Per-probe timeout (default: 10)
--paths-file FILE Custom probe set (one path per line)
For each candidate directory path, the scanner appends a trailing slash and sends a GET. If the response is 200 and the HTML body matches one of the canonical autoindex fingerprints (Apache, nginx, Caddy, Lighttpd, IIS, Python http.server, Node serve, etc.), it's a finding.
Step 3 — Interpret findings
CRITICAL = config or VCS directory listing → direct credential or source-code exposure when combined with skill #6's secret-file probe. Ship same-hour fix.
HIGH = backup / upload / log / app-root listing → significant file
enumeration. Often reveals backup files (.bak, .swp, .orig),
log files with embedded credentials in URLs, and orphaned uploads
from old releases. Ship within sprint.
MEDIUM = asset directory listing → file enumeration but bounded risk if asset content is genuinely public. Still better to disable than to leave on.
Step 4 — Cross-skill chaining
After this skill, suggest:
detecting-exposed-secrets-files(#6) — if any of the secret- file paths (.git/,.env) return an autoindex page instead of the expected file, that's the autoindex feature confirming repo exposure.detecting-debug-endpoints(#7) — directory listings under framework paths (/static/,/public/) sometimes expose framework-debug artifacts.
Examples
Example 1 — Static-asset host audit
User: "We just spun up a new S3 + CloudFront. Verify autoindex isn't on by accident."
python3 ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/detecting-directory-listing/scripts/probe_directory_listing.py \
https://cdn.example.com --authorized --min-severity medium
S3 buckets configured with ListBucket permissions return XML
directory listings; the scanner detects those too.
Example 2 — Following up on .git exposure
User: "Skill #6 found .git/HEAD exposed. Check if the full directory is browseable."
python3 ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/detecting-directory-listing/scripts/probe_directory_listing.py \
https://app.example.com --authorized --paths-file <(echo .git/)
If the .git/ probe returns an autoindex listing instead of the
404 it should, the whole repository is reachable for reconstruction
via GitDumper-style tools.
Example 3 — CI gate against autoindex regression
- name: Directory-listing gate
run: |
python3 plugins/security/penetration-tester/skills/detecting-directory-listing/scripts/probe_directory_listing.py \
"${{ secrets.STAGING_URL }}" \
--authorized --min-severity high
Exit 1 fails the deploy if any HIGH or CRITICAL autoindex finding lands. Catches the regression where a new vhost gets deployed without the deny-autoindex directive.
Output
JSON / JSONL / Markdown. Exit codes: 0 clean, 1 high/critical, 2 error.
Error Handling
- Target returns SPA index for every URL → the scanner's fingerprint check distinguishes a real autoindex from an SPA catch-all. SPAs don't generate autoindex-shaped HTML.
- WAF blocks the scanner → expected behavior on Cloudflare-fronted hosts. The fingerprint will be of the CDN's block page, not the origin.
- Connection error → exit 2.
Resources
references/THEORY.md— Per-server autoindex behavior, fingerprint patterns, S3 / GCS / Azure Blob considerationsreferences/PLAYBOOK.md— Per-server config to disable autoindex (nginxautoindex off, ApacheOptions -Indexes, Caddy disabling browse, etc.) + cloud-storage equivalents../analyzing-tls-config/references/AUTHORIZATION.md— Active-scan authorization pattern