tenant-db-context-enforcement

Prompt file imported from Zynapses/Radiant (.windsurf/workflows/tenant-db-context-enforcement.md). Fill in {{arg1}}, {{tenantId}} before use. Copyright stays with the author.

Tenant Database Context Enforcement Policy

Rule

All Lambda handlers that serve Think Tank Suite tenant apps (Think Tank, Curator, Dojo, Tenant Admin, Omega Lab, Scribe, Think Tank Mac) MUST:

1. Set tenant context using parameterized set_config() — never string interpolation
2. Use the shared database pool from lambda/shared/services/database.ts — never create inline new Pool()
3. Never give tenant apps direct database access — all DB operations go through the Lambda service layer

Think Tank Suite Apps (Tenant-Level)

These apps access resources ONLY through the Lambda service layer with RLS:

Platform-Level Apps (System Admin)

These apps may have elevated access but MUST still use parameterized queries:

Correct Pattern

// ✅ CORRECT: Parameterized set_config
await pool.query(`SELECT set_config('app.current_tenant_id', {{arg1}}, false)`, [tenantId]);

// ✅ CORRECT: SET LOCAL in transaction (auto-cleanup)
await client.query('BEGIN');
await client.query(`SELECT set_config('app.current_tenant_id', {{arg1}}, true)`, [tenantId]);
// ... queries ...
await client.query('COMMIT');

// ✅ CORRECT: Use withSecureDBContext from db-context.service.ts
const result = await withSecureDBContext(authContext, async (client) => {
  return client.query('SELECT * FROM data WHERE id = {{arg1}}', [id]);
});

// ✅ CORRECT: Use shared pool
import { getDbPool } from '../shared/services/database';
const pool = await getDbPool();

Anti-Patterns (FORBIDDEN)

// ❌ FORBIDDEN: String interpolation (SQL injection risk)
await db.query(`SET app.current_tenant_id = '{{tenantId}}'`);

// ❌ FORBIDDEN: Inline pool creation
const pool = new Pool({ host: process.env.DB_HOST, ... });

// ❌ FORBIDDEN: Session-scoped SET without transaction (context leak risk)
await client.query('SET app.current_tenant_id = {{arg1}}', [tenantId]);
// ... missing BEGIN/COMMIT wrapper ...

// ❌ FORBIDDEN: Tenant app with direct DB access
// (Forge is the ONLY exception — it's a platform tool, not a tenant app)
import { Pool } from 'pg';
const pool = new Pool({ host: process.env.AURORA_PROXY_ENDPOINT });

Tenant Infrastructure Operations

When tenant apps need operations that require system-admin DB permissions (e.g., enabling OMEGA brain, provisioning storage, wiring features), they MUST use the Tenant Ops API:

POST /api/v1/platform/tenant-ops/request
{
  "tenantId": "...",
  "operation": "enable_omega_brain",
  "parameters": { ... }
}

Handler: lambda/platform/tenant-ops.ts

Tenant admins can request operations; system admins approve and execute them.

Verification

When reviewing code changes:

1. Search for SET app.current_tenant_id — must NOT use string interpolation
2. Search for new Pool( in handler files — must NOT exist (use getDbPool)
3. Search for from 'pg' in handler files — only via database.ts imports
4. Ensure all tenant-facing handlers call set_config before dispatching