Imported from reason-machines/security-skills (
skills/iac-security-scan-skills/SKILL.md). Install upstream withnpx skills add reason-machines/security-skills --skill iac-security-scan-skills. Copyright stays with the author.
IaC Security Scanner Skills
Skill by ara.so — Security Skills collection.
AI-powered security assessment for Infrastructure-as-Code that provides deep, context-aware security analysis of Terraform and CloudFormation projects. Unlike traditional linters, this scanner identifies cross-domain attack chains, privilege escalation paths, and compliance gaps through multi-stage analysis orchestrated entirely by AI agents.
What It Does
The scanner runs a 3-step pipeline:
- Analysis — Maps repository structure, resources, trust boundaries, and exposure points
- Domain Scanning — Parallel security analysis across IAM, network, storage, secrets, logging, and serverless domains
- Attack Chain Correlation — Identifies composite attack paths across domains and calculates minimum-cut fixes
Key Features:
- Cross-domain attack chain detection (internet → workload → IAM → data)
- Minimum-cut analysis (smallest set of fixes that breaks the most attack paths)
- Confidence scores (0.0–1.0) based on IaC evidence vs heuristics
- Multiple scan modes (full, fast, scoped)
- Parallel domain analysis with intelligent file routing
- HTML, CSV, and terminal output formats
Installation
Copy the scanner skills into your IaC project root:
# Clone the repository
git clone https://github.com/senaykt/iac-security-scan-skills.git
# Copy skills to your project
cd your-terraform-project
cp -r ../iac-security-scan-skills/{AGENTS.md,CLAUDE.md,.agents,.claude,.cursor} ./
# Add scan output to .gitignore
echo "iac-scan/" >> .gitignore
IDE Compatibility:
.agents/skills/— Opencode, Codex CLI, Windsurf.claude/skills/— Claude Code.cursor/skills/— Cursor
All directories contain identical skills; the orchestration files (AGENTS.md or CLAUDE.md) route to the correct location.
Scan Modes
Full Scan
Runs complete pipeline: analysis → all domain skills → attack chains → report.
Run IaC security scan
Or target a specific directory:
Run IaC security scan on the terraform/ directory
Output:
iac-scan/analysis.md— Repository intelligence (≤120 lines)iac-scan/{domain}-results.md— Findings per domain (≤150 lines each)iac-scan/attack-chain-results.md— Cross-domain attack pathsiac-scan/report.html— Full HTML reportiac-scan/findings.csv— Spreadsheet exportiac-scan/architecture-diagram.html— Visual architecture
Fast Scan
Single-pass analysis for quick PR checks. High/Critical findings only, no attack chain correlation.
Run fast IaC scan
Output:
iac-scan/fast-results.md— Compact findingsiac-scan/fast-report.html— Lite HTML report
Use case: PR reviews, pre-commit hooks, quick developer feedback.
Scoped Scan
Run only specific security domains:
Scan only IAM and network
Scan only storage, secrets, logging
Valid domains: IAM, network, storage, secrets, logging, serverless
Attack chain analysis runs only if 2+ domains are selected.
Individual Analyzers
Run a single domain skill:
Run IAM analyzer
Run network analyzer
Run storage analyzer
Run secrets analyzer
Run logging analyzer
Run serverless analyzer
Step 1 (analysis) runs automatically if iac-scan/analysis.md doesn't exist.
Post-Scan Commands
Re-run specific stages without full rescan:
Run attack chain analysis
Generate security report
These read existing iac-scan/*-results.md files and regenerate derived outputs.
Security Domains
IAM (iac-iam)
Detects:
- Privilege escalation paths (iam:PassRole abuse, wildcard permissions)
- Dangerous trust relationships (overly permissive assume role policies)
- Cross-account access risks
- Lateral movement chains
- Service role misconfigurations
Example Finding:
ID: IAM-003
Severity: HIGH
Confidence: 0.95
Title: Lambda execution role allows privilege escalation via iam:PassRole
Description: Role 'data-processor-lambda-role' has iam:PassRole on resource "*"
combined with lambda:CreateFunction, enabling attackers to escalate to any role.
Attack Path: Compromise Lambda → PassRole to admin role → Full account access
Network (iac-network)
Detects:
- Public exposure of internal services
- VPC segmentation gaps
- Security group misconfigurations (0.0.0.0/0 ingress)
- Unrestricted egress (data exfiltration risk)
- Missing VPC endpoints (forced internet routing)
Example Finding:
ID: NET-007
Severity: CRITICAL
Confidence: 1.0
Title: RDS database directly exposed to internet
Description: Security group 'db-sg' allows 0.0.0.0/0 ingress on port 5432,
and RDS instance is in public subnet with publicly_accessible = true.
Blast Radius: Customer PII in 'users' and 'transactions' tables
Storage (iac-storage)
Detects:
- Unencrypted data stores (S3, RDS, DynamoDB)
- Public S3 buckets
- Missing backup/disaster recovery
- Ransomware readiness gaps (versioning, object lock)
- Dangerous data access patterns
Example Finding:
ID: STR-012
Severity: HIGH
Confidence: 0.90
Title: S3 bucket lacks versioning and object lock for ransomware protection
Description: Bucket 'customer-backups' stores critical data but has no
versioning or object lock, enabling ransomware to permanently delete backups.
Recommendation: Enable versioning + object lock (compliance mode, 90d retention)
Secrets (iac-secrets)
Detects:
- Hardcoded credentials in IaC files
- Leaked API keys in environment variables
- Terraform state file credential exposure
- CI/CD secret management issues
- Plaintext passwords
Example Finding:
ID: SEC-002
Severity: CRITICAL
Confidence: 1.0
Title: AWS access key hardcoded in Lambda environment variable
Description: terraform/lambda.tf line 47 contains 'AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID' with
literal value 'AKIA...' instead of secret manager reference.
File: terraform/lambda.tf:47
Code: environment = { AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID = "[REDACTED aws-access-key]" }
Logging & Monitoring (iac-logging-monitoring)
Detects:
- CloudTrail gaps (missing regions, disabled logging)
- GuardDuty not enabled
- Detection blind spots for exposed/privileged resources
- Forensic readiness issues
- Alerting pipeline gaps
Example Finding:
ID: LOG-005
Severity: MEDIUM
Confidence: 0.85
Title: No CloudWatch alarms for privilege escalation APIs
Description: IAM roles allow iam:PutUserPolicy and iam:CreateAccessKey but
no CloudWatch alarm monitors these high-risk API calls.
Recommendation: Create EventBridge rule → SNS alarm for privilege escalation APIs
Serverless (iac-serverless)
Detects:
- Unauthenticated Lambda function URLs
- API Gateway authorization misconfigurations
- Event injection vulnerabilities
- Denial-of-wallet risks (unbounded concurrency)
- Overprivileged execution roles
Example Finding:
ID: SLS-008
Severity: HIGH
Confidence: 0.92
Title: Lambda function URL has no authentication and IAM role allows S3 write
Description: Function 'image-processor' has public URL (auth_type = "NONE")
and execution role allows s3:PutObject on all buckets.
Attack: Unauthenticated attacker → unlimited invocations → cost spike + data poisoning
Attack Chain Analysis
The iac-attack-chain skill reads all domain findings and constructs multi-step attack paths.
Example Attack Chain:
CHAIN-003: Internet to Admin Access (4 steps, exploitability: 0.88)
Step 1 [NET-007]: Public RDS database (0.0.0.0/0 ingress)
↓
Step 2 [SEC-002]: Hardcoded AWS credentials in Lambda environment
↓
Step 3 [IAM-003]: Lambda role allows iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction
↓
Step 4 [IAM-011]: PassRole to 'AdminAccessRole' → full account compromise
Minimum Cut: Fix NET-007 OR SEC-002 (either breaks the chain)
Minimum-Cut Analysis:
The scanner identifies the smallest set of fixes that breaks the most attack paths:
Priority Fix List (breaks 8 of 12 attack chains):
1. NET-007 (Remove 0.0.0.0/0 from RDS security group) → breaks 5 chains
2. IAM-003 (Scope down iam:PassRole to specific roles) → breaks 3 chains
3. STR-012 (Enable S3 versioning + object lock) → breaks 2 chains
Output Files
All results are written to iac-scan/:
iac-scan/
├── analysis.md # Repository intelligence (Step 1)
├── iam-results.md # IAM findings
├── network-results.md # Network findings
├── storage-results.md # Storage findings
├── secrets-results.md # Secrets findings
├── logging-monitoring-results.md # Logging findings
├── serverless-results.md # Serverless findings
├── attack-chain-results.md # Cross-domain attack chains (Step 2.5)
├── findings.csv # CSV export (Step 3)
├── report.html # HTML report (Step 3)
└── architecture-diagram.html # Architecture visualization (Step 3)
Fast scan outputs:
iac-scan/
├── fast-results.md
└── fast-report.html
Supported Project Layouts
The scanner handles all common IaC structures:
| Layout | Example |
|---|---|
| Flat files | main.tf, vpc.tf, iam.tf at root |
| Per-environment | envs/prod/, envs/staging/, envs/dev/ |
| Per-account | accounts/prod-app/, accounts/security/ |
| Terragrunt | Layered account.hcl / region.hcl / env.hcl |
| Per-service repo | App code + infra/ or terraform/ subdirectory |
| CDK app | cdk.json, lib/, bin/, synthesized CloudFormation |
| Serverless Framework | serverless.yml, template.yaml |
| CloudFormation StackSets | Multi-region / multi-account stacks |
| Atlantis-managed | atlantis.yaml with project list |
| Monorepo | Multiple stacks, modules, environments |
Pipeline Optimizations
File Routing:
Step 1 creates a routing table mapping each IaC file to relevant domain skills. Step 2 skills only read files they need (e.g., iam-analyzer skips networking configs).
Compact Artifacts:
analysis.md: ≤120 lines (no full JSON graph dumps)- Each
*-results.md: ≤150 lines - Individual findings: ≤8 lines each
Skip Irrelevant Skills:
analysis.md includes "Recommended Skills" section that excludes domains with no resources (e.g., no Lambda → skip serverless).
Secrets Scope:
On full scans, iac-secrets may check all files. On fast/scoped scans, uses analysis.md file list (IaC/CI/CD/env files only).
Incremental Re-runs:
If iac-scan/analysis.md or domain results already exist, orchestration can skip completed steps and only regenerate HTML/CSV.
Common Patterns
PR Review Workflow
# Developer workflow
git checkout -b feature/add-s3-bucket
# ... make IaC changes ...
# Quick check before commit
# In AI IDE: "Run fast IaC scan"
# Review iac-scan/fast-report.html
# Fix High/Critical findings
git add .
git commit -m "Add S3 bucket with encryption"
Pre-Release Full Scan
# Before production deployment
# In AI IDE: "Run IaC security scan"
# Review all outputs:
# - iac-scan/report.html (full findings)
# - iac-scan/attack-chain-results.md (composite risks)
# - iac-scan/findings.csv (import to ticketing system)
# Prioritize fixes using minimum-cut analysis
Focused Investigation
# Security team investigates IAM configuration
# In AI IDE: "Run IAM analyzer"
# Review iac-scan/iam-results.md
# Check privilege escalation paths
# Expand investigation to attack chains
# In AI IDE: "Run attack chain analysis"
Quarterly Compliance Review
# In AI IDE: "Run IaC security scan"
# Export findings
cp iac-scan/findings.csv /path/to/compliance-reports/2026-Q2-iac-scan.csv
# Review compliance mappings in iac-scan/report.html
# - CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark
# - NIST 800-53
# - PCI DSS
# - SOC 2
Configuration
No configuration files needed. The scanner is controlled entirely through natural language commands.
Environment-Specific Scans:
Run IaC security scan on the envs/prod/ directory
Scan only IAM and network in accounts/security/
Adjust Scope via Commands:
# Minimum scan (fastest)
Run fast IaC scan
# Medium scan (2-3 domains)
Scan only IAM, storage, secrets
# Full scan (all domains + attack chains)
Run IaC security scan
Troubleshooting
"No IaC files found"
Cause: Scanner didn't detect Terraform/CloudFormation files.
Solution:
# Explicitly specify directory
Run IaC security scan on the infrastructure/ directory
# Or check file extensions
# Supported: .tf, .hcl, .yaml, .yml, .json (for CloudFormation)
"Analysis step incomplete"
Cause: iac-scan/analysis.md is missing or truncated.
Solution:
# Delete partial results and re-run
rm -rf iac-scan/
# In AI IDE: "Run IaC security scan"
"Attack chain analysis skipped"
Cause: Only 1 domain was scanned (attack chains require 2+ domains).
Solution:
# Run additional domain
Run network analyzer
# Then correlation
Run attack chain analysis
"Report shows 'Domain not scanned'"
Expected behavior — scoped scans skip irrelevant domains.
Solution: If you need all domains:
Run IaC security scan
"Secrets scan missed a credential"
Cause: Fast scan uses limited file list; scoped scan may skip secrets domain.
Solution:
# Run full secrets analysis
Run secrets analyzer
# Or full scan
Run IaC security scan
"Too many findings to review"
Solution:
# Start with fast scan (High/Critical only)
Run fast IaC scan
# Focus on attack chains
Run attack chain analysis
# Use minimum-cut analysis in report.html
# Look for "Priority Fix List" section
Integration Examples
GitHub Actions
# .github/workflows/iac-scan.yml
name: IaC Security Scan
on:
pull_request:
paths:
- 'terraform/**'
- 'cloudformation/**'
jobs:
scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Run fast IaC scan
# Assumes AI agent CLI available in environment
run: |
# AI agent processes AGENTS.md and runs fast scan
# Output: iac-scan/fast-report.html
- name: Upload scan results
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: iac-scan-results
path: iac-scan/
- name: Check for Critical findings
run: |
if grep -q "Severity: CRITICAL" iac-scan/fast-results.md; then
echo "❌ Critical security findings detected"
exit 1
fi
GitLab CI
# .gitlab-ci.yml
iac-security-scan:
stage: test
script:
- echo "Run IaC security scan" | ai-agent-cli
artifacts:
paths:
- iac-scan/
reports:
junit: iac-scan/findings.csv
only:
changes:
- terraform/**/*
- infrastructure/**/*
Pre-Commit Hook
# .git/hooks/pre-commit
#!/bin/bash
# Check if IaC files changed
if git diff --cached --name-only | grep -qE '\.(tf|hcl|ya?ml)$'; then
echo "🔍 Running fast IaC security scan..."
# AI agent runs fast scan
echo "Run fast IaC scan" | ai-agent-cli
# Check for Critical findings
if grep -q "CRITICAL" iac-scan/fast-results.md; then
echo "❌ Critical security issues found. Review iac-scan/fast-report.html"
exit 1
fi
echo "✅ No critical issues detected"
fi
Advanced Usage
Custom Severity Filtering
Filter CSV export for specific severities:
# Extract only Critical/High findings
awk -F',' '$3 ~ /CRITICAL|HIGH/ {print}' iac-scan/findings.csv > high-priority.csv
Diff Between Scans
Compare findings across deployments:
# Before changes
cp iac-scan/findings.csv baseline-findings.csv
# After changes
# In AI IDE: "Run IaC security scan"
# Compare
diff baseline-findings.csv iac-scan/findings.csv
Compliance Report Generation
Extract compliance-mapped findings:
# Filter for PCI DSS findings
grep "PCI DSS" iac-scan/report.html > pci-compliance-report.html
# Or use CSV for custom reports
awk -F',' '$NF ~ /PCI-DSS/ {print $2,$3,$4}' iac-scan/findings.csv
Skill Files Reference
| Skill | Lines | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
iac-analysis |
~715 | Repository intelligence, file routing, resource inventory |
iac-iam |
~630 | IAM policy analysis, privilege escalation |
iac-network |
~640 | Network exposure, segmentation |
iac-storage |
~750 | Data stores, encryption, backup/DR |
iac-secrets |
~285 | Credential detection |
iac-logging-monitoring |
~620 | Detection coverage, forensic readiness |
iac-serverless |
~640 | Serverless attack surface |
iac-attack-chain |
~790 | Cross-domain attack path correlation |
iac-report |
~180 | Deduplication, prioritization, output formatting |
iac-fast-scan |
~175 | All-in-one lite scan (High/Critical only) |
Total: ~5,400 lines for full pipeline, ~175 lines for fast mode.
License
MIT License — see repository for details.