Imported from meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack (
skills/hunting-credential-dumping-activity/SKILL.md). Install upstream withnpx skills add meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack --skill hunting-credential-dumping-activity. Copyright stays with the author (Apache-2.0).
Hunting Credential Dumping Activity
When to Use
- You have Sysmon ProcessAccess (Event ID 10) and/or process-creation telemetry and want to detect attempts to read LSASS memory or dump credentials.
- You are investigating post-exploitation credential theft.
Do not use this to dump credentials yourself — it analyzes telemetry of such activity. Legit security tools also touch LSASS; corroborate before alerting.
Prerequisites
- Sysmon EID 10 events (with TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage) and/or EID 1 process events.
Workflow
Step 1: Hunt LSASS access and dumping patterns
python scripts/analyst.py hunt events.csv
Flags EID 10 events where TargetImage is lsass.exe with high-risk GrantedAccess masks
(0x1010, 0x1410, 0x143a, 0x1438), and process events showing comsvcs.dll,MiniDump,
procdump ... lsass, rundll32 ... MiniDump, or known tool names.
Step 2: Reduce false positives
De-prioritize known security agents (EDR, AV) as the SourceImage; weight unsigned or unusual
source processes.
Step 3: Confirm
Correlate with file writes of .dmp files and subsequent off-host transfer.
Step 4: Operationalize
Write a Sigma rule for LSASS access masks and comsvcs MiniDump.
Validation
- LSASS access flags are based on access mask, not mere access by trusted tools.
- comsvcs/procdump/rundll32 MiniDump patterns are detected from command lines.
- Findings map to ATT&CK T1003.001/.002.
Pitfalls
- Many legitimate tools open LSASS — access mask + source-image context is essential.
- Attackers renaming tools; rely on behavior (mask, MiniDump export) not just names.
- Direct-syscall dumpers that avoid the usual API and reduce telemetry.
References
- See
references/api-reference.mdfor the hunter. - ATT&CK T1003.001 and Sysmon EID 10 (linked in frontmatter).