Imported from ericrisco/rsc-harness (
skills/email-connector/SKILL.md). Install upstream withnpx skills add ericrisco/rsc-harness --skill email-connector. Copyright stays with the author.
email-connector — put transactional & bulk email on the wire
You wire the send. A welcome mail, a password reset, a receipt, a 4,000-row
digest — your job is the server code that hands it to a provider, makes it safe
to retry, and keeps the suppression list honest. You do not own the inbox
(SPF/DKIM/DMARC/reputation is ../email-deliverability/SKILL.md) and you do
not own the words (subject lines and growth are ../newsletter/SKILL.md,
launch copy is ../marketing/SKILL.md). Generic typed clients for any REST API
are ../api-connector-builder/SKILL.md; deciding when a multi-step sequence
fires is ../automation-flows/SKILL.md.
Stack as of June 2026: resend 6.12.4, @sendgrid/mail 8.1.6, Postmark via its
HTTP API, React Email 5.0 (React 19.2 / Next.js 16, Tailwind 4), Node 20+ / TS.
scripts/verify.sh is read-only and greps a target for the four invariants this
skill exists to hold: env-sourced key, idempotency, a single sendEmail() seam,
and a webhook signature checked on the raw body.
Step 1 — pick a provider
| Provider | Best default fit | Native idempotency | Template model | Batch cap | Pick when |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Resend | Greenfield, React/Next shops | Yes — { idempotencyKey }, 24h, ≤256 chars |
React Email JSX via react: |
100/call | You want JSX templates and the least ceremony |
| SendGrid (Twilio) | High volume, marketing+txn mix | No — dedupe yourself | d- dynamic templates + dynamicTemplateData |
per-send personalizations |
You need 10k req/s scale or already on Twilio |
| Postmark | Pure transactional, deliverability-first | No — self-dedupe via your key + webhooks | Postmark server templates | per-stream | Receipts/resets must never queue behind marketing |
Idempotency support changes your strategy, not just your config — see Step 4.
Full per-provider matrix (auth header, SDK + version, single/batch signatures,
idempotency model, stream/subdomain model, dynamic-template syntax, webhook event
names, rate limits, when to pick each) plus a suppression-webhook handler skeleton
per provider is in references/providers.md.
Step 2 — the sendEmail() seam
One provider-agnostic function. The rest of the app calls sendEmail(...) and
never imports a provider SDK. Why: swapping SendGrid→Postmark is then one file,
not a grep across every call site. That one file reads the key from
process.env — never a re_… / SG.… / server-token literal, because a
committed key is a send-as-you credential and burns your reputation with it.
// lib/email/index.ts — the only place a provider SDK is imported
export type SendArgs = {
to: string | string[];
subject: string;
react?: React.ReactElement; // template component
html?: string;
text?: string;
idempotencyKey: string; // required for transactional sends
stream?: 'transactional' | 'broadcast';
};
export async function sendEmail(args: SendArgs): Promise<{ id: string }> { /* provider impl */ }
// lib/email/resend.ts
import { Resend } from 'resend';
const resend = new Resend(process.env.RESEND_API_KEY);
export async function sendEmail(a: SendArgs) {
const { data, error } = await resend.emails.send(
{ from: 'YourApp <noreply@notify.yourdomain.com>', to: a.to, subject: a.subject, react: a.react, html: a.html, text: a.text },
{ idempotencyKey: a.idempotencyKey }, // 2nd arg, retained 24h, ≤256 chars
);
if (error) throw new Error(error.message);
return { id: data!.id };
}
// lib/email/sendgrid.ts
import sgMail from '@sendgrid/mail';
sgMail.setApiKey(process.env.SENDGRID_API_KEY!);
export async function sendEmail(a: SendArgs) {
const [res] = await sgMail.send({
from: 'noreply@notify.yourdomain.com',
to: a.to, subject: a.subject, html: a.html, text: a.text,
// SendGrid has no idempotency key — guard with your own dedupe (Step 4)
});
return { id: res.headers['x-message-id'] };
}
// lib/email/postmark.ts — raw HTTP, X-Postmark-Server-Token header
export async function sendEmail(a: SendArgs) {
// Postmark has no idempotency key: self-dedupe BEFORE calling (Step 4)
const r = await fetch('https://api.postmarkapp.com/email', {
method: 'POST',
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
Accept: 'application/json',
'X-Postmark-Server-Token': process.env.POSTMARK_SERVER_TOKEN!,
},
body: JSON.stringify({
From: 'noreply@notify.yourdomain.com',
To: Array.isArray(a.to) ? a.to.join(',') : a.to,
Subject: a.subject, HtmlBody: a.html, TextBody: a.text,
MessageStream: a.stream === 'broadcast' ? 'broadcast' : 'outbound',
}),
});
if (!r.ok) throw new Error(`Postmark ${r.status}`);
return { id: (await r.json()).MessageID };
}
Bad → Good:
// Bad — provider SDK called directly in a route handler, key inline
import { Resend } from 'resend';
await new Resend('re_live_123abc').emails.send({ to, subject, html });
// Good — call the seam; key is in env, swap is one file
import { sendEmail } from '@/lib/email';
await sendEmail({ to, subject, react: <Welcome name={n} />, idempotencyKey });
Step 3 — templates
Templates are typed components, not string concat. Why: JSX escapes interpolated values; hand-built HTML invites injection and broken markup.
React Email 5.0 renamed renderAsync → render. The Resend SDK lazily imports
@react-email/render when you pass react:, so you usually pass the component
directly and skip manual rendering.
// emails/welcome.tsx
import { Html, Button, Text } from '@react-email/components';
export function Welcome({ name, url }: { name: string; url: string }) {
return (
<Html>
<Text>Welcome, {name}.</Text>
<Button href={url}>Confirm your email</Button>
</Html>
);
}
// SendGrid: dynamic template referenced by a d- id, data passed separately
await sgMail.send({
to, from: 'noreply@notify.yourdomain.com',
templateId: 'd-abc123...', // dynamic template id starts with d-
dynamicTemplateData: { name, confirm_url }, // values, not pre-rendered HTML
});
// Bad — string concat, unescaped user input straight into HTML
const html = '<h1>Hi ' + req.body.name + '</h1>'; // XSS + broken layout risk
Step 4 — idempotency & retries
Every transactional send carries a key, because queues retry, serverless functions re-fire, and users double-click — without a stable key one password reset becomes three. Derive it from the event, not the clock. Same event → same key → provider (or your table) collapses the duplicate.
const idempotencyKey = `pwreset:${userId}:${tokenVersion}`; // stable across retries
- Resend: native. Pass
{ idempotencyKey }as the 2nd arg; retained 24h, ≤256 chars. For a batch, the key represents the whole batch (e.g.team-quota/123456789), not each row. - Postmark / SendGrid: no idempotency feature. You must self-dedupe: write
the key to a
sent_emailstable inside the same transaction as the send, unique-constrain it, and skip if it already exists.
// Self-dedupe seam for providers without native keys
const inserted = await db.sentEmails.insertIfAbsent({ key: idempotencyKey });
if (!inserted) return; // already sent — do not re-fire
await sendEmail({ to, subject, html, idempotencyKey });
// Bad — no key; queue retry sends the reset 3×
await sendEmail({ to, subject, react: <Reset url={url} /> } as any);
Step 5 — batch / bulk
resend.batch.send([...]) is capped at 100 emails per call and forbids
attachments/scheduling. Chunk larger runs, then inspect both arrays for
partial failure — a 200 response can still contain per-row errors.
Checklist for a bulk run:
- Filter the recipient list against the suppression list (Step 7) first.
- Chunk into ≤100; one
idempotencyKeyper chunk. - Use
batchValidation: 'permissive'so one bad address does not nuke the chunk. - Iterate results: collect succeeded ids and failed rows separately.
- Re-queue only the failed rows; never replay the whole chunk.
function chunk<T>(xs: T[], n = 100) { const o: T[][] = []; for (let i = 0; i < xs.length; i += n) o.push(xs.slice(i, i + n)); return o; }
for (const [i, group] of chunk(recipients).entries()) {
const { data } = await resend.batch.send(
group.map((r) => ({ from, to: r.email, subject, react: <Digest items={r.items} /> })),
{ idempotencyKey: `digest-2026-06/${i}`, batchValidation: 'permissive' },
);
data?.data?.forEach((d) => markSent(d.id)); // succeeded rows
// inspect per-row errors and re-queue only those — do not replay the chunk
}
Step 6 — transactional vs broadcast split
Reputation isolation. Give each stream a distinct From, subdomain, and stream/IP so they cannot poison each other:
| Stream | From | Subdomain | Provider stream |
|---|---|---|---|
| Transactional | noreply@notify.yourdomain.com |
notify. |
Resend default / Postmark outbound |
| Broadcast | news@promo.yourdomain.com |
promo. |
dedicated marketing stream / broadcast |
Why: a marketing send that trips a blocklist must never take password resets
down with it. The DNS/auth setup for those subdomains is
../email-deliverability/SKILL.md's job; you just send on the right one.
Step 7 — delivery/bounce/complaint webhook → suppression
The provider POSTs bounce and complaint events. Verify the signature on the raw body (parse after verifying), then write the address to a suppression list and check that list before every future send. The verification is absolute because this hook mutates the suppression list: unverified, anyone can suppress — or un-suppress — your users.
// app/api/email/webhook/route.ts (Next.js 16) — verify BEFORE parsing
export async function POST(req: Request) {
const raw = await req.text(); // raw body, not req.json()
if (!verifyProviderSignature(raw, req.headers)) return new Response('bad sig', { status: 401 });
const event = JSON.parse(raw);
if (event.type === 'email.bounced' || event.type === 'email.complained') {
await db.suppressions.upsert({ email: event.data.to, reason: event.type });
}
return new Response('ok');
}
// Before any send: skip suppressed addresses
const recipients = candidates.filter(async (e) => !(await db.suppressions.has(e)));
Generic webhook hardening (replay windows, queueing, retries beyond email) is
../webhooks/SKILL.md. The address-validity question (is this mailbox real
before I ever send) is ../lead-gen/SKILL.md / ../email-deliverability/SKILL.md.
Anti-patterns
| Anti-pattern | Why it bites | Do instead |
|---|---|---|
API key hard-coded (re_…, SG.…, server token) |
Committed credential = send-as-you abuse | Read from process.env; rotate via ../secure-coding/SKILL.md |
| No idempotency key on transactional sends | Queue/serverless retry double-sends | Deterministic event:userId:version key |
| One stream for everything | Marketing hit poisons reset/receipt deliverability | Split From + subdomain + stream (Step 6) |
| String-concatenated HTML with user input | XSS + broken layout | React Email component or d- dynamic template |
Ignoring per-row data.errors in a batch |
Silent partial loss; "looked like 200" | Inspect both arrays; re-queue only failures |
| Trusting the webhook without signature check | Anyone can poison your suppression list | Verify signature on raw body, then parse |
| Sending to a bounced/complained address | Reputation damage, ISP penalties | Filter against suppression list before send |
| Calling the provider SDK at scattered call sites | Provider swap = grep across the app | One sendEmail() seam (Step 2) |