Imported from autogrammar/doql (AGENTS.md). Install upstream with npx skills add autogrammar/doql. Copyright stays with the author.

AGENTS.md

This target repository follows wellmanifest/new-project policy-as-code.

Before any multi-step implementation, an agent must:

1. Read .governance/manifest.json, TODO.md, project/TICKETS.md and the active ticket.
2. Reuse an unfinished ticket whose workstream and scope match. A second active ticket is allowed only in a distinct workstream with no write-scope overlap. Otherwise run ./project/new-ticket.sh --title "..." --agent "..." --workstream "...".
3. Complete the ticket README.md, owned ai-*.md, intent.json and TODO.md.
4. Treat a user request that already says to execute or work autonomously as SESSION_EXECUTION_AUTHORIZATION; record it in the agent-owned ticket file.
5. Move to EDIT without a second confirmation and stay inside intent.json allowedPaths. Ask for new authority only for destructive action, secret access, new external coordination, or material objective expansion.
6. Never create or edit project/ticket-*/user-*.md; only its human owner or a trusted intake boundary may do so.
7. Keep executable source/tests/scripts outside ticket directories.
8. Run the managed ./project/governance-check.sh plus the stack checks before reporting completion.
9. Serialize ticket-ID allocation before branching, then use a separate branch/worktree per implementation ticket. Each diff must resolve to exactly one active ticket. Shared contract paths are edited only by the declared integration workstream; integrationTicket coordinates work but does not transfer path ownership.
10. Only IN_PROGRESS reserves a workstream and write scope. BACKLOG, PLAN and BLOCKED retain evidence without blocking another implementation; transition back to IN_PROGRESS before changing source or tests.
11. Treat GitHub review as trusted only when it targets the current HEAD and either a User login is in protected trusted-reviewers or a Bot login is in the separate protected trusted-validator-apps input. Never trust an arbitrary Bot review.
12. Require merge approval evidence to bind repository, PR, current HEAD, active ticket and actor. The protected resolver creates that evidence outside the PR checkout; repository-authored evidence is untrusted.
13. A signed attestation is trusted only after a protected verifier validates its signature, issuer, predicate type and subject bindings.
14. Validator-agent examples use LLM_MODEL_VALIDATOR=openrouter/z-ai/glm-5.2; model findings stay advisory.
15. Configure GitHub with delete_branch_on_merge=true. A merged ticket branch must disappear after merge. A PR closed without merge keeps its branch until the owner explicitly discards that unmerged work. When no PR is open, the only remote branch is the default branch.
16. At merge, publication or explicit pilot discard, inventory temporary linked worktrees and duplicate clones. Verify dirty state and HEAD reachability before removal; preserve unknown or unique data. Remove an exact linked worktree through Git, prune its metadata and only then delete its released disposable branch. Prefer recoverable trash for a verified duplicate clone. Run the adopted workspace lifecycle checker through Goal for the terminal audit. CI validates GitHub state separately and cannot inspect a developer filesystem.

Markdown approval is an audit note, not trusted merge approval. Required merge approval comes from the repository's protected review, attestation and ruleset boundary.